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Torts of Administrative Personnel of Hospitals
Rathuel L. McCollum*
N LITIGATION against a hospital the plaintiff often alleges that
the defendant is liable for damages because its servant or
agent has caused his injury. Frequently the courts have spoken of
hospital personnel as acting in either (1) a medical or profes-
sional capacity or (2) an administrative capacity. The former
category is generally considered to be comprised of doctors and
nurses, whereas the latter category comprises the remainder of
the hospital staff, who are considered to be servants. In Schloen-
dorff v. Society of New York Hospital' the court referred to the
superintendent, assistant superintendents, orderlies and "other
members of the administrative staff" as being servants of the
hospital.
The purpose of this article is to review and analyze cases in
which torts have been committed by hospital personnel who may
be considered as administrative employees.
Obstructions Near Entrances and Exits
Failure of hospital employees to keep entrances and exits
free of obstructions may result in injury to one walking on the
premises. Thus, liability arose where a husband, while carrying
his wife from the hospital building where she was a patient,
tripped over an iron pipe which negligently had been placed and
permitted to remain close to the exit.2
Another type of obstruction is one in which a chain was
placed negligently across a walk leading to a private side door
previously used as a public entrance to the hospital, without
placing any notices nearby warning that the door was no longer
used as a public entrance. The hospital was held liable for in-
juries sustained by a wife who tripped on the chain while ap-
proaching the entrance to visit her husband, a patient there.3
* B.S., Morehouse College; graduate studies at N. Y. Univ. and Univ. of
Mich.; Physicist on Research Staff of Lewis Research Center of National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Cleveland, Ohio; member of Cleve-
land Physics Society and Beta Kappa Chi Honorary Scientific Society; and
a third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E.
92 (1914).
2 Cohen v. General Hospital Soc., 113 Conn. 188, 154 A. 435 (1931).
3 Comess v. Norfolk General Hospital, 189 Va. 229, 52 S. E. 2d 125 (1949).
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The court pointedly reiterated the principle of law that an owner
of premises must give notice or warning of any unsafe condi-
tion unknown to an invitee, unless the dangerous condition is
open and obvious to a person exercising reasonable care for his
own safety.4
Slippery Floors
The condition of floors of a hospital is a source of much con-
cern. It is especially important during visiting hours. Often the
janitors have mopped floors but the floors are not completely dry
by the time visitors arrive. At other times the polishing wax
has not dried sufficiently to be walked on without special care.
In McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital5 the plaintiff, while visit-
ing her husband, slipped and fell on a hospital floor and sustained
injuries by reason of faulty construction of the tile and some
slippery substance thereon. The defendant received judgment in
the trial on the basis of charitable immunity. The Court sustained
a demurrer to the plaintiff's replication that the hospital had li-
ability insurance. Upon appeal the judgment was reversed and
the case was ordered tried on the merits of the issue.
It should not be assumed that every fall on a slippery floor
at a hospital will result in a judgment in favor of the victim.
In a Louisiana case6 the plaintiff was visiting a sick friend and
sustained injuries from a fall on the floor of the hospital corridor,
which had been waxed. However, at the trial evidence showed
that while the floor was being waxed by a hospital employee
warning signs were posted in the corridor, warning the public
of the slippery condition of the floor.7 The suit was dismissed
and that judgment was affirmed on appeal.
In an action against a private non-charitable hospital, a
private nurse attending a paying patient recovered for injuries
sustained when she slipped on leaves and flower petals which
had been allowed to remain on the floor of a corridor.8 Employees
of the hospital had neglected to remove the debris.
Weather conditions may have considerable effect upon the
question of negligence. That was a part of the problem presented
4 Prosser, Law of Torts 452 (2d ed. 1955).
5 McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 432, 95 S. W. 2d 917 (1936).
6 Lusk v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 199 So. 666 (La. 1941).
7 Prosser, op. cit. supra, n. 4.
8 Bounds v. Baldwin, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 434, 41 N. E. 2d 901 (1941).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss3/6
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
in the case of Doctors Hospital v. Badgley.9 A visitor slipped and
fell on a polished wet floor of the hospital lobby. Rain had fallen
during the six hours elapsed time from the last mopping with a
dry mop until the accident occurred. The court held that the
question of negligence was one for jury.
The decision that seemingly set back justice for years
evolved from the twin cases of Fredericksburg Hospital and
Clinic v. Springall and vice versa.10 This was an action by a
visitor against the hospital for injuries that she received in a fall
on a floor of the hospital that had been treated with a liquid wax.
The jury found: (1) that the floor was slick and slippery; (2) that
the defendant caused such condition; (3) that such action con-
stituted negligence; and (4) that there was no contributory neg-
ligence on the part of the plaintiff. Yet, the jury brought in a
verdict for the defendant. To the credit of the trial judge, it must
be said that he set aside the verdict as irreconcilable with the
findings of fact. However, the defendant applied to the Civil
Court of Appeals of Texas for a writ of mandamus to require
the trial judge to render judgment on the verdict. The appellate
court gave the judge the choice of rendering judgment or having
the writ of mandamus issued. Upon judgment being given for the
defendant, the plaintiff appealed to the Civil Court of Appeals.
They said:
We are of the opinion that the record does not show as a
matter of law, that appellee's acts were the proximate cause
of Mrs. Springall's injury."
There could be logic in the reasoning of this Court. However,
this writer doubts that one lifetime would be long enough to
find it.
Elevator Injuries
It must be something of a shock to step where an elevator
is supposed to be and find nothing under one's feet but empty
space. This was the crux of the complaint in Hospital of St. Vin-
cent v. Thompson.12 The plaintiff had gone to the hospital to
render necessary aid to a potential patient, and sustained in-
9 Doctors Hospital v. Badgley, 156 F. 2d 569 (D. C. Cir. 1946).
10 Fredericksburg Hospital and Clinic v. Springall, 220 S. W. 2d 692 (Tex.,
1949); and Springall v. Fredericksburg Hospital and Clinic, 225 S. W. 2d
232 (Tex., 1949).
11 Springall v. Fredericksburg Hospital and Clinic, supra, n. 10.
12 Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914).
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juries as a result of the elevator shaft being left negligently un-
protected. Although a beneficiary of the charity could not have
recovered, the plaintiff, being a stranger to the charity, could
maintain his action successfully.
Recovery was denied the plaintiff in Emery v. Jewish Hos-
pital Assn.13 on the ground that respondeat superior did not
apply to a charitable corporation. In this case the injured party
was a boy alleged to be only 15 years of age when he was hired
by the hospital to operate the elevator in violation of a state
statute. He was injured while performing his duties. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's action in overruling the
plaintiff's demurrer to the defendant's answer.
In the frequently cited case of Williams' Adm'x. v. Church
Home for Females and Infirmary for Sick 14 a death action was
filed. Plaintiff pleaded that while the intestate was entering an
elevator in the home, the elevator was started through the gross
negligence of the operator, an employee of the defendant, and
that the intestate received injuries from which she died. The
plaintiff contended further that the defendant had liability in-
surance on the elevator in the amount of $5,000, and that by the
terms of the policy the home was protected against loss in any
death claims filed against it by any person suffering injuries on
the elevator. A demurrer to the petition was sustained and the
plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky refused to retreat from
its position holding charitable institutions exempt from liability
for the torts of agents or employees. 15 As to the liability in-
surance contract, the court held it to be a contract of indemnity
only. Then it followed that if there be no loss, there is no li-
ability on the part of the company. Thus, where the hospital
servant could not bind his master for his torts, neither could the
master's insurer be held liable.
Defective Equipment Furnished to Patients
The responsibility for furnishing suitable equipment for pa-
tients belongs to the hospital administrator and his subordinates,
as distinguished from those qualified to use such equipment. In
13 Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n., 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921).
14 Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home for Females and Infirmary for Sick,
223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. 2d 753, 62 A. L. R. 721 (1928).
15 Emery v. Jewish Hospital, supra, n. 13.
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Miller et ux. v. Sisters of St. Francis et al.,1' the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant failed to furnish a proper bassinet for a baby,
who was placed in an adult bed adjacent to a radiator and as a
consequence suffered a burn. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's
evidence the defendant moved to strike certain testimony and
also for a dismissal of the petition. Both motions were granted,
whereupon the plaintiff appealed. The court stated that a hospital,
even though it be a charity, is liable for failure to furnish proper
equipment.
In Cristini v. Griffin Hospital,17 the plaintiff charged the hos-
pital with negligence in failing to provide proper equipment for
his baby. In this case the baby died. The administrator of the
hospital testified concerning the steps taken to provide the equip-
ment. He offered in evidence a circular issued by the manu-
facturer.
The court charged, over the objections of the defendant, and
without mentioning charitable immunity, that the defendant was
liable for negligence, to which the defendant excepted. The jury
found that the baby received the burns because an agent of the
hospital acting within the scope of authority had dropped him.
Upon appeal the judgment was set aside and a new trial was
ordered on the question of liability. As in the Williams case,'
8
the court held that liability insurance does not determine li-
ability for torts. The opinion stated:
If the charitable institution is not liable for the neg-
ligence alleged, it cannot be made liable because it took out
insurance which would cover a judgment against it. 10
A different type of injury due to faulty equipment occurred
in the case of Holtfoth v. Rochester General Hospital.20 The
plaintiff brought an action against the hospital for injuries
sustained when the right leg rest of a wheel chair collapsed,
causing the patient's right foot to strike the floor. Reversing the
lower court, the Court of Appeals of New York held that the
question whether the hospital administration exercised reason-
able care to provide a wheel chair in a safe condition was for
the jury to decide. A new trial was ordered.
16 Miller et ux. v. Sisters of St. Francis et al., 105 P. 2d 32 (Wash. 1940).
17 Cristini v. Griffin Hospital, 134 Conn. 282, 57 A. 2d 262 (1948).
18 Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home for Females and Infirmary for Sick,
supra, n. 14.
19 Cristini v. Griffin Hospital, 134 Conn. 282, 57 A. 2d 262, 264 (1948).
20 Holtfoth v. Rochester General Hospital, 304 N. Y. 27, 105 N. E. 2d 610,
31 A. L. R. 2d 1113 (1952).
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Negligence in Guarding Patients
Often injuries sustained by hospital patients are self inflicted.
The question of negligence involves the duty of the hospital to
provide adequate quarters and employees to prevent the patient
from doing violence to himself. The intensity of pain may well
be a factor in determining why the patient acted in the manner
that he did. In Downs v. Harper Hospital21 the question of neg-
ligence on the part of the hospital trustees was presented. The
plaintiff's decedent, who was insane, was placed in the defendant
hospital. He was violent and was confined in a third floor room
that was especially arranged for such patients. The decedent
wrenched the iron framework from the window and jumped to
his death. The court stated that the hospital was not liable, on
the basis of charitable immunity. Negligence of the hospital
trustees in the construction of the building would not affect the
decision.
An action was brought in the case of Mills v. Society of New
York Hospital2 2 for damages as a result of the death of a paying
patient who committed suicide while on a walk in company with
four other patients and only one hospital aide. The court held
that a charitable hospital was not liable for such a death, on the
basis that there was no administrative negligence.
A different result was reached in Fowler v. Norways Sani-
torium.23 The suicidal tendencies of the patient were known by
both the hospital administrative officer (a physician) and the
attendant under orders to guard him. Owing to the negligence
of the attendant the patient committed suicide. Upon appeal
by the plaintiff the court held that the question of the hospital's
liability for the negligence alleged should be decided by the
jury.
Falls Resulting in Injuries to Patients
Care necessary in handling of patients is a matter that can-
not be overemphasized. Unable to move himself or care for
himself, the patient must look to attendants for aid. Gentleness
and caution are the orders of the day in such instances.
In McCormack v. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn24 an action
21 Downs v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894).
22 Mills v. Society of New York Hospital, 242 App. Div. 245, 274 N. Y. S.
233 (1934); affd. without opinion, 270 N. Y. 594, 1 N. E. 2d 346 (1936).
23 Fowler v. Norways Sanitorium, 42 N. E. 2d 415 (Ind., 1942).
24 McCormack v. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn, 26 App. Div. 731, 283 N. Y. S.
737 (1935).
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was brought against a hospital to recover for injuries sustained
by a patient who fell while being carried down the stairs to the
ambulance on a stretcher. The trial court dismissed the action.
Upon appeal it was held that testimony to the effect that a per-
son was injured while being carried on a stretcher down stairs
to an ambulance sent by the hospital establishes a prima facie
case of negligence.
A decision that caused reverberations throughout the country
was rendered in Avelone v. St. John's Hospital.2 5 The plaintiff
alleged that he was admitted to the defendant hospital, as a pay-
ing patient, for surgery; that soon after his admission he was
negligently permitted to fall from a bed furnished by the defend-
ant, and that as a result he sustained injuries; then the defendant
again negligently permitted him to fall out of a bed, whereby
he sustained further injuries.
The defendant denied that it was negligent, and as a separate
defense alleged that it was a corporation not for profit, main-
taining and operating a charitable hospital. A demurrer to the
separate defense was overruled and the action was dismissed.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed prior de-
cisions on the subject of the doctrine of respondeat superior and
the current shift in legislative and judicial policy concerning
hospital immunity. The syllabus of the decision is as follows:
(1) A corporation not for profit, which has as its pur-
pose the maintenance and operation of a hospital, is under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, liable for the torts of
its servants. (Taylor, Admr. v. Protestant Hospital Assn., 85
Ohio St. 90, Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115 Ohio St. 539, and
paragraphs one and two of the syllabus of Lakeside Hospital
v. Kovar, Admr., 131 Ohio St. 333, overruled.)
(2) In an action to recover damages for injury to a
patient alleged to have been caused by the negligence of a
non-profit hospital, an answer filed by the defendant, which
alleges that it is a corporation not for profit maintaining and
operating a public charitable hospital, does not state a de-
fense and is subject to demurrer.
The distinction made between the relation of a hospital to
doctors and nurses and that existing between a hospital and
other personnel is quite important. The court pointed out that
they were not deciding that persons such as doctors and nurses,
under circumstances where the hospital has no authority or right
25 Avelone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N. E. 2d 410 (1956).
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of control over them, can bind the hospital by their negligent
acts. They stated the following:
The present case has to do only with the pleadings and
does not extend beyond the question of liability of a hospital
for the negligence of those employees who can and do make
the hospital answerable for their actions under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.26
Thus, in litigation against a hospital in Ohio involving a tort
committed by a member of the staff, the question of control exer-
cised over the tortfeasor is of utmost importance. The decision
in one of the chief law-making states is of great importance in all
the states.
False Imprisonment of Patients
False imprisonment is the confinement of a person within
certain boundaries fixed by the wrongdoer, without legal justi-
fication, by an act or breach of duty intended to result in such
confinement.27 The fact that the plaintiff considered that he was
being restrained is not sufficient unless he had reasonable ground
to believe that force would be used to prevent him from attain-
ing his liberty.
Where a patient enters a hospital for treatment he does not
thereby surrender legal control of his person to the hospital au-
thorities. In Cook v. Highland Hospital2s the plaintiff brought an
action for damages for false imprisonment. She was sane, but
entered the hospital not knowing that it was an institution for
the insane. Subsequently she was detained against her will. The
fact that the head of this private asylum believed in good faith
that he was entitled to imprison a patient who desired to leave
was held to be no defense and the hospital was liable for damages.
The situation in Boardman v. Burlingame29 was different
from the prior case discussed. Here the plaintiff was a former
inmate of a hospital for mental diseases. The action for damages
was based on the ground that the plaintiff was induced by fraud
and deceit practiced by employees to remain in the hospital for
several months. A judgment for the plaintiff was set aside.
26 Ibid., at 478.
27 Prosser, op. cit. supra, n. 4, at 48.
28 Cook v. Highland Hospital, 168 N. C. 25, 84 S. E. 352 (1915). See also
Hoffman v. Clinic Hospital, 213 N. C. 669, 197 S. E. 161 (1938).
29 Boardman v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 197 A. 761 (1938).
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Traffic Accidents Involving Hospital Vehicles
Operation of a hospital ambulance in densely populated areas
with heavy traffic is indeed a formidable problem. However, the
privileged "emergency" nature of the vehicle does not give its
driver a right to throw caution to the winds. Where the vehicle
is driven negligently, accidents are likely to occur, and liability
may be found.
An action was brought for injuries sustained in a collision
between an ambulance and a taxicab in which the plaintiff was
riding, in Murtha v. New York Homeopathic Medical College and
Flower Hospital.30 The court refused to grant immunity to the
defendant even though the ambulance service was supplied
pursuant to a statute which granted to emergency-trip ambu-
lances the privilege to ignore some traffic laws.
In Daniels v. Rahway Hospital3 ' the court held the hospital
liable to the plaintiff, who had no beneficial relation to the hos-
pita! and xas iniiurel in a collision bethtween the hnnitq1 nm-
bulance and an automobile, due to the negligence of the am-
bulance driver.
The first case in which the New York Court of Appeals was
presented with the question of recovery by a beneficiary of a
hospital for injuries sustained by the negligence of a mere servant
or employee was decided in 1937. The action was brought in
Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital.3 2 The plaintiff,
a paying patient, was being removed to her home in the hospital
ambulance and was injured, through the negligence of the
driver, in a collision between the ambulance and another ve-
hicle. The court decided that the hospital was liable, citing
Schloendorfj v. Society of New York Hospital.33
The federal courts were called upon to decide the case of
Henry W. Putnam Memorial Hospital v. Allen,34 where there
was no controlling state decision. Mary K. Allen brought the
action against the hospital and Samuel C. Haynes to recover for
personal injuries incurred in a collision between the automobile
30 Murtha v. New York Homeopathic Medical College and Flower Hospital,
126 N. E. 722 (N. Y. 1920).
31 Daniels v. Rahway Hospital, 10 N. J. Misc. 585, 160 A. 644 (1932).
32 Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 7 N. E. 2d 28, 109
A. L. R. 1197 (N. Y. 1937).
33 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, supra, n. 1.
34 Henry W. Putnam Memorial Hospital v. Allen, 34 F. 2d 927 (2d Cir.,
1929).
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driven by her and the hospital ambulance driven by Haynes. A
verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff. Both de-
fendants appealed from the judgment of the District Court of
the United States for the district of Vermont. Unhampered by
any prior binding state decisions, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment.
Negligence of Hospital Technicians
At law, hospital technicians at one time may have been
"neither fish nor fowl," but today they may be either. Gradually,
the picture is coming into focus, as to their legal status.
In National Homeopathic Hospital v. Phillip an action had
been brought to recover for the death of the plaintiff's decedent.
The petition alleged that, while the deceased was a patient at
the defendant hospital, death resulted from a transfusion of in-
compatible blood that had been tested and reported, erroneously,
by a technician in the hospital as being compatible. The court
stated:
The main question was whether such a relationship pre-
vailed between the hospital and technician as to render the
hospital liable upon the principle of respondeat superior.
The trial court held a master and servant relationship did
exist, and submitted the question of negligence to the jury,
which returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
We think the court was right. The undisputed evidence
showed that the laboratory was an established part of the
hospital. By arrangement with an outside physician it was
operated under his overall direction. The technician was
hired and paid by the hospital. In this case the hospital, in
usual course, ordered a laboratory test. The technician,
without the presence or supervision of the physician, made
the test and submitted her report directly to the hospital.
Relying thereon the hospital made the transfusion. In our
opinion the facts clearly established the responsibility of the
hospital for the acts of its technician. ...
The court pointed out that this responsibility was not af-
fected by the fact that, even though agreeable to statutory re-
quirements, the technical work in the laboratory was put under
the "direction" of a physician.
Another blood-typing error was involved in the case of Berg
v. New York Society for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crip-
35 National Homeopathic Hospital v. Phillips, 181 F. 2d 293 (D. C. Cir.,
1950).
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pled.3 6 Mrs. Berg was given the wrong type of blood in a trans-
fusion, due to the error of the laboratory technician who analyzed
a sample of the patient's blood.
At trial of the action brought against the attending physician
and the hospital, the court, sitting without a jury, awarded judg-
ment against the hospital, holding it liable for the laboratory
technician's negligence in reporting the blood classification. Upon
appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, after reversal by
the intermediate appellate court, the judgment of the trial court
was reinstated. Although the court called the blood test a
"medical act" in that it was preparatory to a transfusion, they
decided against the hospital under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, because the laboratory was "no independent prac-
titioner" but "a salaried employee doing routine work which re-
quired a minimum of skill and training."
A different type of technician was involved in the case of
/fissniss~,ippi P,, o+ TJo, W-. . or37 The plani ifFn llg-crl flnt
she fell and injured her arm, that her attending physician ad-
vised her that he was afraid that the arm had been fractured,
and that it would be necessary for her to have an x-ray picture
made to discover whether or not this was a fact. She further
alleged that the defendant did take a picture of her arm, which
picture did not disclose the true condition thereof and that the
arm was treated for a sprain and not for a break, and because
of the improper treatment the arm had become permanently and
totally impaired. The trial court rendered judgment for the plain-
tiff. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the judgment and
rendered judgment for the defendant, stating in paragraph 4 of
the syllabus as follows:
A plaintiff in a suit for negligence in taking an X-ray
picture, by reason of which picture a fracture was not dis-
closed, must prove with reasonable certainty that the in-
jury would not have resulted had a proper picture been
made and proper treatment administered.
This puts such an injured party in the position of attempting
to prove what might not have happened. Could anything be more
ridiculous?
36 Berg v. New York Society for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled,
136 N. Y. S. 2d 528 (1954); revd., 283 App. Div. 783, 146 N. Y. S. 2d 548(1955); judgment of trial court reinstated, 1 N. Y. 2d 499, 154 N. Y. S. 2d
455, 136 N. E. 2d 523 (1956).
37 Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 126 So. 465 (Miss., 1930).
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Libel by Hospital Personnel
One of the types of action infrequently brought against a
hospital is that of libel. In Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hos-
pital,s the secretary of the hospital, acting within the scope of
his employment, dictated an alleged libelous letter to his private
stenographer, who, at his direction transcribed her notes, wrote
the letter and mailed it to the plaintiff as directed by the secre-
tary. The court held that this constituted publication within the
law of libel, regardless of whether the relation between the sec-
retary and the stenographer was that of master and servant or
of co-employees of the hospital. Thus the hospital was not im-
mune from liability for this tort, although it was a non-profit
charitable corporation.
Suppose that two patients having identical names were con-
fined to the same hospital. Upon discharge of both of them one
paid his bill in full but the other one defaulted. Should the
hospital address a letter and cause it to be delivered to the one
who had paid his bill accusing him of failure to do so, this would
constitute libel if it could be shown that publication of the letter
occurred.
Miscellaneous Torts
A hospital may be held liable where a student nurse flings
open a door, striking a special nurse-3 9 ; where an attendant neg-
ligently leaves an electric lamp on a patient's bed and it sub-
sequently falls into the bed, burning the patient'0 ; or where em-
ployees retain possession, unlawfully, of the body of a deceased
person.4 1 However, in a Maryland case the hospital was held
not liable to a fireman for injuries sustained while in the per-
formance of his duties on the hospital premises.42 Here the court
would not hold the hospital liable for the negligence of its em-
ployees in allowing the fire escape to become defective. Apparent-
ly that merely is one of the hazards of the fireman's trade!
38 Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N. D. 525, 23 N. W. 2d 247,
166 A. L. R. 99 (1946).
39 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810
(D. C. Cir., 1942).
40 Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital and Dispensary, 284 N. Y. 176, 30
N. E. 2d 373 (1940).
41 Howard v. Childrens Hospital, 37 Ohio App. 144, 174 N. E. 166 (1930).
42 Loeffler v. Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 A. 300
(1917).
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss3/6
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
The recent case of Morwin v. Albany Hospital43 deserves
special attention. There the hospital, with no charitable im-
munity for negligence, under the New York rule, sought to avoid
liability for a staff anesthetist's possible negligence. It argued,
in effect, that he, being a doctor, was guilty of malpractice; and
only doctors, not hospitals, can commit malpractice. Both the
legal profession and the medical profession await the final disposi-
tion of this case with intense interest.
Conclusions
In jurisdictions where the doctrine of charitable immunity
does not offer hospitals complete protection from liability for
torts of their agents or employees, the status of the actual tort-
feasor is of prime importance. If he belongs to that class who
are considered servants or administrative employees, the hospital
is liable for his torts committed in the course of his employment.
An employee of a hospital engaged in duties other than the
practice of medicine, and under the control of the hospital, is an
administrative employee, under the view generally expressed in
decisions hitherto. But the negligence of a hospital administrator
in either hiring or failing to discharge an incompetent resident
staff member should bind the hospital for the torts of such per-
son as well as for the torts of a cleaning woman. This is true even
though the tort feasor was, at the time of his wrongful act or
omission, "engaged in the practice of medicine," because surely
he was serving the purpose of the hospital. There seems to be
no good reason why the doctrine of respondeat superior should
not apply in such an instance.
43 Morwin v. Albany Hospital, 7 A. D. 2d 582, 185 N. Y. S. 2d 85 (Supr. Ct.,
App. Div., 3rd Dept., Apr. 23, 1959).
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